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In his A Theory of Justice, John Rawls claims his 
social contract theory can be considered part of the 
social contract tradition which includes Locke, Rous-
seau and Kant. 1 The purpose of this essay is to deter-
mine what defines a tradition such as that of the so-
cial contract and to evaluate Rawls' claim that he is 
in the same tradition as Rousseau. At the same time, I 
analyze the general nature of the contract model and so 
clarify some of the controversial points in Rawls' and 
Rousseau'8 political theories. 
I. Rousseau: 
In the Social Contract Rousseau characterizes the 
contract in these terms: "although they (the clauses 
of the contract) have perhaps never been formally set 
forth, they are everywhere the same and everywhere tac-
itly admitted" (14).* Rousseau believes these clauses 
can be reduced to one: "the total alienation of each 
associate, together with all his rights, to the whole 
community" (14). Each must alienate all rights since 
if any right were left to individuals, without a "com-
mon superior" to decide between conflicts of individu-
als and public, the state of nature would ensue and the 
association dissolve. Each participant, 
in giving himself to all, gives himself to 
nobody; and as there is no associate over which 
he does not acquire the same right as he yields 
others over himself, he gains an equivalent for 
everything he loses, and an increase of force for 
the preservation of what he has. (14) 
In another definition of the social contract, 
Rousseau introduces the key concept of the "general 
will" (volonte generale) (henceforth abbreviated GW): 
Each of us puts his person and all his power in 
common under the supreme direction of the general 
will and in our corporate capacity, we receive 
each member as an indivisible part of the whole. 
(15) 
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In the Emile, Rousseau is even more insistent on the 
radical nature of the alienation demanded by the con-
tract: 
As an Individual everyone of us contributes his 
goods, his person, his life, to the common stock 
under the supreme direction of the general will. 1 
The body politic of the sovereign, then, derives its 
existence only from the contract. The sovereign, being 
only the aggregate of the individuals, is the supreme 
power in the society. 
Few concepts in the history of political theory 
have been as controversial as Rousseau's notion of the 
GW. There is no question, however, that it is the key 
to understanding Rousseau. According to Rousseau, each 
Individual has a particular will which aims at his par-
ticular interests. In the state of nature only the 
particular will and private interest exist. The GW, 
which exists only in the political state, aims at the 
common or general interest. For Rousseau, then, the 
'will' is distinguished by its object; the private will 
tending towards the private interest, the general will 
at the general object of interest. Sovereignty is no-
thing else but "the exercise of the GW" (23). More-
over, Rousseau contends that the GW "is always right" 
(26), but he does not take this to mean that the major-
ity is always right. Rousseau wants to draw a distinc-
tion between the GW and the "will of all," the latter 
being simply the sum of particular wills (26). How 
then is the GW ascertained if not by a majority vote? 
Rousseau's answer is as complex as it is elusive. 
At first he suggests that the GW remains as "sum of the 
differences" between the particular wills (26). More 
specifically, the GW emerges from the deliberation of 
all the citizens when they have the "adequate informa-
tion" and if the "citizens had no communication with 
one another" (27), i.e., when there are no factions or 
parties within the state which seeks their own ends 
rather than the common end. Though Rousseau rejects 
the view that the GW is simply the aggregate of partic-
ular wills, he does believe it can be expressed by a 
majority will under certain conditions. The majority 
will is the GW if when the issue is before the national 
assembly 
the people is asked not exactly whether it ap-
proves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is 
in conformity with the GW, which is their will 
. . . and the GW is found by counting votes. 
(106) 
If one finds oneself in the minority, then Rousseau be-
lieves one must conclude "I was mistaken" about the GW 
and one's own will. In the above quotation Rousseau 
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states the GW "is their will/' i.e., the will of the 
individual; does then each person have two wills, the 
general and the particular? No, what Rousseau must 
mean is that the GW is the will of the individual as 
citizen, not as a private individual. Hence if one is 
in the minority on a given vote, one is in error as to 
one's interest as citizen, though not necessarily as 
private person. 
Once the contract is completed, the individual par-
ties to it have renounced all rights and possessions to 
the body politic. For Rousseau, there are in principle 
no limits to the GW; "the social compact gives the body 
politic absolute power over all its members" (28). If 
an individual finds oneself in disagreement with the 
GW, he will be "compelled to do so by the whole body. 
This means nothing less than that he will be forced to 
be free" (18). If 'freedom* is construed as the ab-
sence of external coercion, then "forcing" someone to 
be free is a contradiction in terms. But another in-
terpretation of this Rousseauan definition of freedom 
can make this notorious passage consistent. In the 
state of nature man enjoyed what Rousseau calls 
"natural liberty" (19), i.e., the unlimited right to do 
anything and have anything instinct suggested without 
coercion from others. In civil society one loses nat-
ural liberty but gains civil or "moral liberty" (19). 
This is freedom to do what is morally permissible as 
defined by the GW. Moral liberty "alone makes (man) 
truly master of himself" (19). Doing what one wants, 
or natural liberty, is to follow "the mere impulse of 
appetite (which) is slavery" (19). Moral liberty is 
desiring to do what one ought to do, not merely want to 
do, which only "obedience to the law" can reveal as the 
expression of the GW. Hence Rousseau saw freedom as 
doing what one ought to do, or being unrestrained from 
doing what one ought to do; if one erred as to what 
one'8 true moral duty was, one could be forced to be 
free, i.e., forced to do what is really in one's in-
terest, as opposed to doing what is only apparently 
one's interest. 
II. Rawls: 
Rawls believes his principles of justice would be 
chosen by free, rational, equal and self-interested in-
dividuals within a well-defined context which he calls 
the "Original Position" (henceforth, OP). As in 
Rousseau, this agreement is not an historical event but 
a hypothetical construct; it consists in the claim that 
'individuals' or persons of the OP (henceforth, POPs) 
would choose certain principles of justice under prop-
erly defined circumstances. These circumstances which 
define the OP consist of what Rawls takes to be certain 
rules of rationality, general empirical facts and rele-
vant moral intuitions.* 
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The "Veil of Ignorance" expresses some of the con-
ditions that members of the OP are subject to. This 
fictional veil means POPs are ignorant of: a) their 
place in society, status or position; b) fortune, nat-
ural talents such as intellectual ability or physical 
strength; c) their particular conception of the good; 
d) their psychological propensities; e) to which gener-
ation they belong. These conditions allow for the 
principles of justice to be chosen without the influ-
ence of prejudice that knowledge of one's natural and 
social circumstances would lead to. To allow inform-
ation about such matters of social happenstance would 
be to select principles which would be shaped, at least 
in part, by this 'prior' society and its social contin-
gencies which may be an unjust society. 
This way of regarding justice Rawls calls "justice 
as fairness" for these principles would result from 
free agreement among individuals under the above de-
scribed circumstances. For Rawls, a practice is fair 
when none of those participating in it feel he is being 
taken advantage of or being compelled to give in to 
what he considers illegitimate claims. 
Having described the limits on the knowledge of 
these hypothetical persons, Rawls must next give these 
individuals some content to explain their decision in 
favor of some principles of justice rather than others. 
By stipulating that these decision-makers are "free" 
Rawls means they have no authority over one another. 
By "rational" he means they are interested in further-
ing and taking the most effective means to their given 
ends (14). By "equal" is meant POPs are capable of 
having a conception of the good and a sense of justice 
and, in addition, they have the same degree of deci-
sion-making powers in the OP (19). Finally, by adding 
that POPs are "self-interested" Rawls does not intend 
to convey that POPs are egoists, but merely that they 
are concerned in advancing their goals and desires. 
Given these conditions, Rawls believes the princi-
ples of justice chosen would be: 
I) Each person has an equal right to the most ex-
tensive total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty 
for all. 
II) Social and economic inequalities are to be ar-
ranged so that they are both: 
a) to the greatest benefit of the least advan-
taged consistent with the just savings 
principle and 
b) attached to offices and positions open to 
all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity. (302) 
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By "basic liberties" is meant the right to vote, hold 
public office, free speech, assembly, thought and 
property (61). Rawls believes these two principles are 
a special case of a more "general conception" of jus-
tice, namely: 
. . . all social values, liberty and opportunity, 
income and wealth and the bases of self-respect 
are to be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution of any or all these values is to 
everyone's advantage. (62) 
The reason POPs would choose these principles is 
that they provide for what Rawls calls "primary goods" 
or "what a rational man wants whatever else he wants" 
(92). That is, they are necessary means to fulfilling 
one's plan or goal of life, whatever these happen to 
be. These goods include rights and liberties, opportu-
nities and powers, income and wealth and self-respect. 
The two principles would be chosen by rational self-
interested persons as the best way for each to secure 
his ends. Though POPs do not know their particular 
conception of the good they do know they have a ration-
al life-plan and to achieve this end they prefer more 
primary social goods which the two principles of jus-
tice guarantee. 
III. The Logic of the Contract: 
The theories of Rousseau and Rawls, and that of 
Locke and Hobbes as well, are complex structures made 
up of what may be termed formal and material compo-
nents. Contract theory is distinguished from other 
models of political obligation in that agreement or 
consent is the foundation of any legitimate political 
authority; this is the formal dimension which all con-
tract theories share. In Rawls, the agreement is 
hypothetical, i.e., what properly defined individuals 
would agree to in the OP. The hypothetical contract 
obligates, Rawls believes, just as a real contract does 
because it is a result of moral beliefs we in fact pos-
sess or can be persuaded to hold after proper consider-
ation. Rousseau's contract also has the non-historical 
or hypothetical form for, as has been pointed out 
above, Rousseau concedes the contract as he describes 
it may "have perhaps never been formally set forth" 
(14). (Indeed, considerations to follow will show that 
the contract cannot be other than a hypothetical one.) 
However, this similarity of the formal component is 
only partial, for the hypothetical aspect of Rousseau's 
contract has an actual element which is essential for 
its completeness. 
Recall, in the Social Contract, Rousseau first 
stipulates that for the GW to emerge from an assembly 
of citizens three conditions must be met: 1) relevant 
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Information must be available (27); 2) citizens must 
not form parties or communicate with one another (27); 
and 3) the question must be put to the assembly in this 
form: "Is it in the common interest?" and the decision 
makers must ignore their own private interests. Mow, 
this closely approximates Rawls' Original Position; the 
last two conditions correspond to the Veil of Ignorance 
and the formal constraints of universality and general-
ity on principles of justice and the first to the gen-
eral knowledge people in the Original Position are said 
to have at their disposal. The crucial difference, 
however, is that Rawls' OP is a conceptual device con-
structed so as to lead to the desired conclusion, the 
Two Principles, whereas Rousseau's recommendations are 
for a real assembly of people who know who and what 
they are and what they want. This difference is not 
without significance. 
The problematic character of the idea of the GW is 
revealed when the presuppositions of the three condi-
tions that the General Assembly must meet to derive the 
GW are made explicit. First, to disregard one's own 
particular interests assumes a kind of altruistic moral 
perfection, which Rousseau cannot explain or guarantee. 
But even if they were to disregard their interests, 
this would presuppose that some sort of cognitive per-
fection has been attained, for they must know infalli-
bly what their interests are if they are to effectively 
disregard them. Even granted that such a state were 
attainable, it would still be a private psychological 
state for which there seem to be no public criteria and 
therefore no way to determine whether the condition is 
in fact present. The second condition states that the 
Assembly must have all the "relevant information" (27) 
but Rousseau gives no criteria for this relevance. The 
third and final pre-condition for the Assembly requires 
that there be no factions or parties formed. Clearly, 
this condition, too, is unattainable for it would 
necessitate an omnipresent and omniscient state to 
monitor all communications between individuals at all 
times. In sum, to assert, as Rousseau does, that the 
GW is infallible (26), is to make the implausible claim 
that human society composed of fallible and finite 
creatures can reach political infallibility in history. 
The above difficulties with the GW are compounded 
by the fact that the GW has only a procedural inter-
pretation, i.e., it is the outcome of a procedure fol-
lowed by the General Assembly; there are no independent 
substantive criteria for judging whether the Assembly's 
decisions are in fact the GW. Using Rawls' terminol-
ogy, Rousseau's method is an instance of "pure proce-
dural justice" (86), which obtains when there is an ap-
propriate procedure which, if followed properly, will 
yield the correct or just result, but there is no inde-
pendent criteria with which to evaluate the outcome. 
As in games of chance, so too in the case of the GW, 
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the procedure must actually be carried out before the 
solution can be known. In Rawls, however, there is a 
relatively independent set of criteria by which to ad-
judicate the outcome of his procedure, our considered 
moral judgments. Thus, Rawls' approach may be termed 
what Rawls calls "imperfect procedural justice" because 
criteria of the correct outcome do exist. In imposing 
conditions that can only be applied in a hypothetical 
situation on an actual collection of persons, Rousseau 
has outlined a decision procedure which cannot be actu-
alized in the real world. But without the General As-
sembly to complete and define the nature of the politi-
cal community which the General Will demands, Rous-
seau's contract remains an empty abstraction. 
This limited concurrence in the definition of the 
formal component of the contract in Rawls and Rousseau 
is further diminished when the variables that consti-
tute the material components of contract theory are 
defined. Agreement never occurs in a vacuum nor is the 
contract some eternal unchanging form; agreement always 
results in a specific contract whose specificity is 
determined by who agrees to what and for what purpose. 
The manner in which these material components are 
characterized will reveal the sources of the incommen-
surability between Rousseau and Rawls. 
What contractees agree to, the clauses that consti-
tute the contract, is a function of some goal or pur-
pose they wish to actualize. These goals may be val-
ues, institutions, relationships, conditions or, more 
generally, a certain kind of socio-political structure 
or community. What these goals are is a function of 
three factors: 1) what the contractees perceive as ac-
tual, i.e., their circumstances and condition; 2) what 
they believe is possible for them to achieve given man 
and his condition; 3) what the contractees see as de-
sirable, the values or rights they wish to promote or 
preserve. 
In Rousseau, the purpose of the contract was not 
the protection of rights, but the more nebulous one of 
establishing a society where the values of liberty and 
equality would be realized and promoted through the 
General Will and the total alienation of rights. But, 
more importantly, Rousseau's ultimate goal, as will be 
shown below, was the creation of a new kind of human 
nature, a nature more noble, compassionate and wise. 
In the case of Rawls, the goal of his theory, from 
our own point of view, is to clarify our moral intui-
tions, but from the point of view of the POPs, it is to 
define principles of justice to ensure themselves the 
basic goods, namely, rights, liberties, opportunities, 
power, income, wealth, and self-respect. And to a-
chleve this, they agree to the Two Principles. 
The material category of Agreement 'by whom' is 
concerned with the definition, essence or nature of the 
contractees, those party to the contract. This is a 
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crucial component of any political theory, including 
that of the contract, for the contract consists in the 
definition of the relations that must exist between 
those party to it and the nature of the relations must 
be at least partly based on the nature of the relata, 
the contractees. In establishing the nature of man 
three components are especially relevant here: 1) the 
character and extent of his innate capacities, motiva-
tions and weaknesses; 2) the relation and influence of 
the physical . and social environment on his condition 
and achievements; 3) the nature of his relation to 
other persons. These elements are relevant in deter-
mining the degree and nature of the obligations, func-
tions and responsibilities of the contractees. 
Though we cannot here embark on a comprehensive and 
fully detailed discussion of Rousseau's concept of man, 
still a brief discussion is inevitable for an under-
standing of his contract. 
It is clear from the First Discourse (FD) and 
Second Discourse (SD) that Rousseau believes contem-
porary man has degenerated and become decadent, im-
moral, in short, alienated from his essential nature.* 
Rousseau's theory of ideal human nature has at least 
five essential elements. First, Rousseau tells us that 
the two basic principles of man's essence are those 
which concern our well-being, namely, "self-preserva-
tion" (SD, 95) or "Amour de soi," and the principle 
which "inspires in us a natural repugnance to see any 
sensitive being perish or suffer, principally our 
fellowmen" (SD, 95, 130-1), namely sympathy, pity or 
compassion. The third essential component of man is 
his freedom, as Rousseau says in his famous lines of 
the Social Contract, "Man is born free and is every-
where in chains" (3, 19). And in the SD, it is man s 
freedom more than his "understanding" or reason which 
constitutes man's distinction from other animals (114). 
This freedom means man, unlike other animals is not a 
slave to his instincts but "is free to acquiesce or 
resist" (SD, 114) his instincts. In addition to this 
ontological sense of freedom, according to Rousseau, 
man in the state of nature has what may be called 
"economic" and "psychological" freedom. By the former, 
Rousseau means for a man to be fully free, and hence 
fully human, he must have enough to satisfy his needs 
so that he does not become a slave to the rich.' 
Psychological freedom expresses Rousseau's belief in 
the need for the absence of dependence on others for 
one's sense of worth or respect; recall how in the SD 
Rousseau laments man's alienated state where he comes 
to "live in the opinion of others." 
The fourth dimension of man's nature is his ability 
and need to labor to satisfy his wants. Rousseau does 
not state explicitly that this is part of man's es-
sence, but it is implicit in his writings. We saw that 
one of his basic critiques of the then contemporary 
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French society in the First Discourse is its luxury and 
idleness (46, 49, 53). In the Discourse on Political 
Economy Rousseau contends society must avoid extreme 
wealth so that "Labor is always necessary and never 
useless for its acquisition" (255). And, finally, 
Rousseau's objections to commerce and his advocacy of 
agriculture and the barter system, is based on his un-
derstanding that entrepreneurs are idle and only far-
mers are said to really earn their income. 
The fifth element of man's essence Rousseau calls 
man's "perfectibility" (SD, 115), or the faculty which 
"successfully develops all the others" (SD, 114). 
Unfortunately, Rousseau says little beyond this to 
clarify the nature of this supposed faculty. In addi-
tion, he rejects "reason" as essential to man, which 
seems the only faculty that "perfectibility" may name. 
Such remarks as "the state of reflection is a state 
contrary to nature and the man who meditates is a de-
praved animal" (SD, 110) and "reason engenders vanity 
and reflection fortifies it" (SD, 132) supports the 
reading that reason is not part of perfectibility. 
However, in the First Discourse, which is often inter-
preted as the apothesis of ignorance and barbarity, 
Rousseau does in fact allow for the exercise of the in-
tellect and the development of science and the arts as 
long as their influence consists in increasing the 
"happiness of the people" (63). This can occur only 
when governmental power and man's wisdom work together, 
not separately and at odds with one another. Hence, it 
seems reason, correctly used, may indeed have a proper 
role in the ideal society of men. 
In sum, man properly understood, is a creature 
which preserves itself, has compassion for others, is 
free, labors and is perfectible (rational). Rousseau 
objects to man'8 present condition because it frus-
trates his nature in that many individuals are rich and 
idle, and many unfree due to their poverty, and perhaps 
most significantly, most have lost the virtue of com-
passion which has hurled society into a veritable state 
of war. In a corrupt and alienated society "amour de 
soi" or self-preservation degenerates into "amour-
propre" or conceit and vanity. Rousseau believes his 
social contract reestablishes freedom and compassion by 
totally alienating all rights, rediscovers the virtue 
of labor by recreating an agrarian city-state, and bap-
tizes the arts of sciences which now work for man, not 
against him. 7 
Rawls* own views on the nature of man are not easy 
to ascertain for he nowhere explicitly states them. 
Yet his descriptions of the POPs do give some indica-
tion of how he sees man. He sees him as morally and 
intellectually limited, free, self-interested, i.e., 
concerned to promote his own good, rational and non-
envious, since envy tends to make everyone worse off 
and is therefore irrational. Of all these traits. 
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Belf-interestedness is the most crucial component of 
Rawlsian man. It is on that basis that POPs choose to 
maximize the "primary goods" or "what a rational man 
wants, whatever else he wants" (92). On this view, 
rationality logically entails self-interestedness, and 
without it, the principles of justice POPs would choose 
would be substantially different. This self-centered 
view of man is further revealed by man's existence un-
der what Rawls calls "circumstances of justice" (126) 
including scarcity of basic goods, which, in turn, adds 
to the potential for conflict. 
Of course, Rawls is quick to note that the motiva-
tion of POP is not necessarily that of real people out-
side the OP (147-8), yet if there is no structural 
isomorphism between the relevant motives within and 
without OP, then the two principles of justice would be 
irrelevant to man as he is. In this regard, it is im-
portant to mention the Aristotelian Principle, which 
Rawls doesn't discuss until the end of his treatise, is 
an important element of human nature which apparently, 
POPs do not know about and hence is not a contributing 
factor in their deliberation. 
The most fundamental reason for the difference 
between Rousseau's and Rawls' political theories lies 
in their definition of what man is. As we noted above, 
Rawls assumes that human nature as it is, with the ten-
dency to self-interest, was acceptable and a rational 
starting point from which to build a theory. Rousseau, 
on the other hand, sought to destroy the roots of self-
interest in man for he saw it as a source of decadence, 
disunity and ultimately war itself. This is quite ap-
parent especially in Rousseau's Second Discourse. 
There Rousseau observes that man's essential trait of 
sympathy and compassion was overcome and suppressed by 
the development of private property and the ensuing 
competition for superiority which brought forth envy 
and vanity among men. As Rousseau saw it "in a word, 
competition and rivalry on one hand, opposition of in-
terest on the other and always the hidden desire for 
profit at the-expense of others. All these evils are 
the first effect of property and the inseparable conse-
quence of nascent inequality.1'* This eventually re-
sulted in a state of war. 
We see then, that the similarity between Rawls' and 
Rousseau's respective theories of the social contract 
rests simply on the formal dimension of agreement as 
the necessary condition for the establishment of polit-
ical authority; they diverge on who (human nature) 
makes the agreement, and for what purpose (their 
visions of the "good" society). The society which 
Rousseau envisioned resulting from and constituted by 
the social contract was radically distinct from the 
society in which he saw contemporary man. It would be 
a society populated by a new type of man, a type which 
had overcome vanity, competition, pride and self-
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interest. At the heart of Rousseau's theory, then, is 
a revolutionary interest to transform mankind and soci-
ety. This approach is diametrically opposed to that of 
Rawls. 
Rawls assumes that our present considered moral 
judgments and given human nature are an acceptable 
starting point for political theory. To be sure, the 
OP does make more precise these moral intuitions, but 
the changes required by the Two Principles can be car-
ried out in an evolutionary manner within the existing 
institutions of western liberal democracy. This is 
made even more perspicuous by Rawls in a recent article 
where he states: 
. . . we are not trying to find a conception of 
justice suitable for all societies regardless of 
their particular social or historical circum-
stances. We want to settle a fundamental disa-
greement over the first form of basic institu-
tions within a democratic society under modern 
conditions . . . Our hope is that there is a com-
mon desire for agreement as well as a sufficient 
sharing of certain underlying notions and implic-
itly held principles . . . the aim of political 
philosophy . . . is to articulate and to make ex-
plicit those shared notions and principles . . .* 
Ultimately, then, what lies at the heart of the 
disagreement between Rousseau and Rawls is radically 
opposed visions of what man and human society should 
be; unfortunately, it is not clear that these respec-
tive visions are ultimately persuasive. 
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